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Data Imperialism: The GDPR's
Disastrous Impact on Africa's ECommerce Markets
ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) recently passed the General Data
Protection Regulation-a sweeping regulatory framework that
sets a new global standardfor the collection, storage, and use of
personal data. To ensure far-reaching compliance with the
GDPR, the EU has adopted a strict take-it-or-leave-it approachcountries that wish to engage with digital users in the EU must
either comply with the GDPR's expansive data obligationsor risk

losing access to the world's largest tradingblock.
This presents significant obstacles for several African
nations. Notably, no African country currently has domestic laws
that comply with the GDPR. Even if they did, several African
countries lack stable judicial branches to enforce such laws, and
many do not have the technologicalinfrastructuresor expertise to
ensure ongoing compliance.
Additionally,
the
GDPR's
extraterritorialeffects may amount to data imperialism,allowing
the EU to impose its own definition of data privacy on African

countries without concern for their unique social values and
economic realities.
This Note analyzes how the GDPR negatively impacts

several African countries, as well as the difficulties in solving
these economic and social problems. Although there are no easy
solutions for these complex issues, this Note recommends that
African countries adopt data privacy legislation at the regional

level, create regional enforcement authorities, and invest in
technological infrastructureand training.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) recently put into effect the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)-a landmark data privacy law
that gives EU residents unprecedented control over how their personal
data is collected and used.' In passing the GDPR, the EU intended to
set global standards for data protection that extended well beyond the
borders of its twenty-eight member countries. 2 This is largely achieved
through an extraterritoriality feature that imposes privacy obligations

on non-EU companies that offer products or services to EU residents. 3
To give the GDPR's extraterritorial provisions some bite, the EU
adopted a firm take-it-or-leave-it approach: countries that wish to
engage in e-commerce with EU residents must either pass domestic
laws that comply with the GDPR's expansive data obligations or risk
losing access to the world's largest trading block. 4 However,
compliance comes with hefty costs. 5 For example, countries not

1.
See Mark Scott & Laurens Cerulus, Europe's New Data Protection Rules
Export Privacy Standards Worldwide, POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe(last
data-protection -privacy-standards -gdpr-general-protection-data-regulation/
updated Feb. 6, 2018) [https://perma.c/6EJW-YHDN] (archived Nov. 12, 2019).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
Id.; see also Jeremy Kahn, Stephanie Bodoni & Stefan Nicola, It'll Cost
5.
Billions for Companies to Comply With Europe's New Data Law, BLOOMBERG
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currently in compliance must hustle to enact GDPR-friendly
regulations, and these countries then must expend resources to enforce
such regulations. 6 Individual companies must also pay handsomely to
achieve organizational compliance with the GDPR if they wish to
electronically transact with EU residents.7

For countries with advanced economies, the choice between GDPR
compliance or market shutout is likely an easy one. 8 Many of these
countries already have data protection frameworks in place, which
reduces the regulatory burden of matching the GDPR's gold
standards. 9 Furthermore, companies within these developed countries

are more likely to be technologically sophisticated.' 0
But for developing countries, there may be no real choice between
compliance or market shutout.11 This is particularly true in Africa.12
Notably, no African countries currently have domestic laws that

comply with the GDPR.1 3 In fact, some African countries lack data
privacy regulations altogether, such as Algeria, Comoros, and the
Central African Republic.1 4 And even if an African country has some
data protection laws in place, other concerns-like corruption and
public safety-commonly take enforcement priority.15
Many of these countries face significant factors that prevent them
from achieving GDPR compliance, including a lower level of
technological sophistication, few supporting services, and turbulent
lawmaking bodies. 16 Small businesses within these developing
countries may also lack the knowledge or budgets needed to comply
with the GDPR's complicated data protection rules.17

The stakes are high for African countries. The EU is one of South
Africa's

largest trading

partners,

comprising

40 percent

of the

BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-22/it11-cost-billions-for-companies-to-comply-with -europe-s-new-data-law
[https:/Iperma.cc/D737-G5KA](archived Dec. 20, 2019).
6.
See Scott & Cerulus, supra note 1.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
See Tiffany Curtiss, Privacy Harmonization and the Developing World: The
Impact of the EU's Developing Economies, 12 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 95, 108-09 (2016)
(noting that developing countries face many more obstacles than developed countries).
10.
Id.
11.
Scott & Cerulus, supra note 1.
12.
Id.
13.

See DALBERG ADVISORS, NOT JUST AN EU CONCERN: THE IMPLICATIONs FOR

AFRICA
7
(Jan.
2018),
https://www.dalberg.com/system/files/201805/GDPR_Implications%20for%20Africa_EMAIL%20PDF-vFinal%20March2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BS6P-TYZ9] (archived Nov. 12, 2019).
14. Id. at 14.
15.
See Curtiss, supra note 9, at 111, 119 (noting corruption as a risk in choosing
a developing country as an enforcing authority for the GDPR).
16. Id. at 108.
17. Id. at 110.

688

VANDE RBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:685

country's e-commerce business. 18 What is more, Africa's digital
19
economy exports USD $14 billion to the EU every year. In passing
the GDPR and disallowing partial compliance, the EU has jeopardized
Africa's existing e-commerce markets, as well as the continent's
opportunity to help innovate the e-commerce market in the future.
This Note evaluates the GDPR's disproportionate impact on
Africa's participation in the global e-commerce market. Part II of this
Note explains key portions of the GDPR and evaluates current data
protection regimes in Africa. Part III analyzes the factors that cause
the GDPR to disproportionally impact some African countries. These
factors include difficulties in enforcing breached data rights, issues
with maintaining technologically educated workforces, and the stifling
of economic growth. Part III also analyzes a phenomenon known as the
Brussels Effect, which could result in the imposition of Eurocentric
ideals on African economies and governments. Finally, Part IV
explains the difficulties in solving these issues, as well as some first
steps that can be taken to level the data privacy playing field in African
nations. These steps include adopting data privacy legislation at the
regional level, creating regional enforcement authorities, and investing
in technological infrastructure and training.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The GDPR and Its Wide-Reaching Impacts
The European Union (EU) passed the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) in April 2016.20 This sweeping data privacy regime
21
gave EU residents unprecedented autonomy over their personal data.
According to one commentator, the GDPR will "fundamentally reshape
the way in which data is handled across every sector, from healthcare
22
to banking and beyond."

18.
See
South
Africa,
EUROPEAN
http:/ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-africa/

COMM'N,
(last

visited Feb. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/CWC4-ELQP] (archived Nov. 15, 2019).
19.
Id.
Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
20.
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons With Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Council Directive
95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
See Manu J. Sebastian, The European Union's General Data Protection
21.
Regulation:How Will It Affect Non-EUEnterprises?,31 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 216,
216-18 (2015) (describing the GDPR as the most comprehensive and forward-looking
piece of data protection legislation in the digital age).
See The EU General DataProtectionRegulation (GDPR)is the most important
22.
change in dataprivacyregulationin 20years, EU GDPR PORTAL, https://eugdpr.org/(last
visited Feb. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9ZHS-BYUA] (archived Nov. 15, 2019)
[hereinafter GDPR is the most important change in 20 years].

20201
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The GDPR is based on the idea that every individual has a right

to have his or her data protected. 23 As such, the GDPR gives
individuals a series of enforceable rights over their data privacy
interests. 24 These data privacy rights include:
"

The right to object

"

information (known as the right to object).
The right to have personal data erased (known as the right to be

to an

entity processing

personal

data

forgotten).
"
"

"

The right to have inaccurate data corrected (known as the right to
rectification).
The right to know what personal data is being processed, by whom,
and whether other parties may receive it.

The right to hold data collectors accountable for violating data
privacy rights under the GDPR.25

To satisfy these enumerated individual rights, the GDPR imposes
substantial obligations on parties that wish to digitally interact with
EU residents.2 6 For example, a party may only collect and use data

that is necessary to accomplish the specific task that led to the
collection of data in the first place. 27 Data processors may also be
required to adopt various security safeguards, such as encrypting the

identity of data subjects and buying cyber liability insurance. 28
Additionally, entities that process data must disclose any data
breaches to applicable regulators within seventy-two hours of the
breach.29

Compliance with these obligations will undoubtedly prove costly
for businesses. As of March 2018, the five hundred largest corporations
in the world are on track to spend a total of $7.8 billion to comply with
the GDPR. 30 Microsoft tasked three hundred engineers with ensuring

its software complied with the GDPR. 3 1 Smaller businesses are also
facing heightened compliance costs under the GDPR. As Facebook
Chief Operating Officer Sheryl Sandberg said at a conference in

Brussels, the "GDPR holds companies of all sizes to account" since

23.
See Sebastian, supra note 21, at 216-17 (explaining the El's belief that
personal data protection is a fundamental right that should be enjoyed by all).
24.
Id.
25.
Joseph Facciponti & Katherine McGrail, GDPR Is Here-What If You Didn't
Prepare?, LAw360
(May 24,
2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1047079
[https:/perma.cc/2QFZ-SDQ4] (archived Nov. 13, 2019).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
See id.
29.
Id.
30.
See Kahn, Bodoni, & Nicola, supra note 5.
31.
Id.
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every modern business-no matter its size-uses data to improve their
2

services.3
The EU's adoption of this sweeping data privacy regime is not
surprising given the region's history in the privacy arena. The EU has
33
long been regarded as a leader in data protection laws. In 1995, the
European Parliament passed the EU Data Protection Directive, which
sought to harmonize a patchwork of data protection regimes that had
34
been adopted by individual member states of the EU. To achieve this
harmonization, the Data Protection Directive required each member

state to enact national data protection legislation that served two main
objectives: (1) to protect the individual right to data protection, and (2)

to guarantee the free flow of personal information between member
states. 35 Looking back on the directive's impact, experts say the
directive was successful in deterring data breaches and helped to
36
expand e-commerce between member states.
Despite these successes, EU regulators soon recognized the need

to modernize the Data Protection Directive. 37 The directive was
adopted during the internet's infancy in 1995, when only 1 percent of
38
In the decade since EU
the European population used the internet.
regulators passed the directive, technological advancements had

completely changed how companies and other entities collected, stored,
and used consumer data. 39 Additionally, as a nonbinding directive, the
Data Protection Directive of 1995 allowed individual member states to
uniquely interpret the rules when adopting them into individual
national law, which jeopardized the directive's overall mission of
unifying the different member states' individual data protection

landscapes. 40 Thus, EU regulators began to explore a new data
protection regime that would expand EU citizens' data autonomy and
4
further reduce the occurrences of data breaches. 1

Id.
32.
See European Data Protection Supervisor, The History of the General Data
33.
Protection Regulation, EUROPEAN UNION, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/dataprotection/legislation/history-general-data-protection-regulationwen (last visited Oct. 28,
2018) [https://perma.cc/H5C7-4L7S] (archived Nov. 13, 2019) (noting that the EU's data
protection laws have been regarded as the world's "gold standard" for years).
See Curtiss, supra note 9, at 99.
34.
Id.
35.
36.
Id.
See How did we get here? An overview of important regulatory events leading
37.
up to the GDPR, EU GDPR PORTAL, https://eugdpr.org/the-process/how-did-we-get-here/
(last visited Nov. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/AH37-XCCW] (archived Nov. 13, 2019).
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
40.
Id.
See Nate Lord, What is the Data ProtectionDirective? The Predecessorto the
41.
GDPR, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2018), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-dataprotection-directive-predece ssor-gdpr [https://perma.ccYW3H-B5Z5] (archived Nov. 13,
2019).
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After four years of negotiations, regulators eventually adopted the

GDPR in April 2016, which supersedes and phases out the Data
Protection Directive. 4 2 Although the GDPR builds on key provisions
found in the Data Protection Directive, many of its features go well

beyond its predecessor. For example, the GDPR contains an expanded
definition of what constitutes personal data, more stringent consent
requirements, and an increasing amount of responsibility placed on

companies to protect their consumers' data. 43 Yet perhaps the most
sweeping reform found in the GDPR is its extraterritoriality feature,

which set up a global conflict on what level of data protection
governments should demand. 44
1. Key Extraterritoriality Provisions of the GDPR

In passing the GDPR, the EU intended to set sweeping standards
for data protection that extended well beyond the borders of its member
states. 45 Indeed, Vera Jourovd, the European commissioner for justice,
told the media in 2017 that the EU intended to set a global standard
when passing the GDPR. 46 The EU achieved this through two
provisions that bring non-EU companies under the GDPR's purview.
First, the GDPR covers any non-EU company that monitors the
behavior of individuals within the EU. 47 This includes the tracking of
individuals' internet usage. 48
Second, the GDPR applies to any company that offers goods or
services to individuals located within the EU. 49 Under this provision,
it does not matter whether a financial transaction takes place in the
offering of goods or services.5 0 Rather, a company meets this threshold
by undertaking affirmative actions, however small, to solicit customers
in the EU. 5 1 This means that the GDPR would not be triggered by an

EU resident's mere access of an international entity's website. 52
However, an entity may trigger the GDPR if it accepted EU currencies

on its website, provided content in EU languages, or hosted an EU-

42.
Id.
43.
See The EU General Data Protection Regulation Questions and Answers,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 6, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/06/eugeneral-data-protection-regulation [https://perma.cc/6GKE-SQ7N] (archived Nov. 13,
2019) [hereinafter GDPR Q&A].
44. Id.
45.
See Sebastian, supra note 21, at 242-43 (explaining the GDPR's effects on
"the entire global trading system and almost every international enterprise in the
world").
46.
Scott & Cerulus, supra note 1.
47.
See GDPR, supra note 20, at art. 3(1).
48.
Id. at pmbl. 24.
49.
Id. at art. 3(2)(a).
50.
See Facciponti & McGrail, supra note 25.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
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based website domain-all actions that may constitute an affirmative
offer of goods or services to EU residents. 53 Although these
characteristics provide examples of when a non-EU company may
trigger the GDPR, there is no bright-line test clearly articulating when
this trigger is pulled. 54 As such, these assessments will likely be made
on a case-by-case basis, creating a potential risk that companies

incorrectly guess-or take the calculated risk-that the GDPR does not
55
apply to their businesses.

2. Complying with the GDPR
The GDPR sets forth two pathways to compliance: (1) national
adoption of laws and regulations that comply with the GDPR or (2)
organizational adoption of company procedures that comply with the

GDPR.5 6
Under the first pathway, countries pass their own data protection
legislation. 57 This legislation need not match the GDPR's gold
standards point-for-point. 58 Instead, the GDPR requires countries to
pass laws that offer a standard of data protection that is equivalent to
the protection offered under the GDPR. 59 When assessing this
equivalency, the EU evaluates a variety of factors, including (1) the
substance of the country's legislation, (2) whether the country can
effectively implement and enforce this legislation, (3) the country's
commitment to the rule of law and overall respect for fundamental
freedoms of the individual, and (4) international data protection
60
commitments.
Under the second pathway, individual companies can still achieve
GDPR compliance even if they are located in countries that lack the
regulatory framework required by the GDPR. 61 This is primarily
achieved in two ways: (1) the company can independently adopt
corporate rules and procedures that adequately protect consumer data
under the GDPR or (2) the company can enter into contracts requiring
subcontractors to maintain reasonable levels of security and obey
applicable security laws. 62 However, these interorganizational

53. Id.
54.
Id.
See Long Arm of the Law -Impact of the GDPR on Middle East Organisations,
55.
DENTONS
(Sept.
28,
2017),
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2017/september/28/long-arm -of-the-law[https://perma.cc/5446-TJLB]
impact-of-the-gdpr-on-middle-east-organisations
(archived Nov. 15, 2019).
See id.
56.
See id.
57.
See id.
58.
See id.
59.
See id.
60.
See Curtiss, supra note 9, at 101.
61.
Id.
62.
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strategies have not been widely adopted.63 As of May 2018, fewer than
two hundred companies globally have received approval from a
national data protection authority certifying their binding corporate
rules as compliant with the GDPR. 64
3. The Costs of Failing to Comply with the GDPR
Notably, the EU has adopted a strict take-it-or-leave-it approach:
data controllers must either comply with the GDPR's expansive data
obligations or risk losing access to the world's largest trading block. 6 5

Although this strict approach presents a difficult choice to countries
around the world, some critics-like the author quoted below-argue
that the EU's strong-arming could disproportionally impact developing
countries. 66
[Achieving GDPR compliance] is mostly manageable for advanced economies like
Japan, which last year set up an independent agency to handle privacy
complaints to conform with Europe's privacy standards during negotiations for
a new Japan-EU trade deal. But for emerging countries, the cost and
67
administrative burden of applying the EU privacy standards can be daunting.

The official deadline to become GDPR-compliant was supposed to
be May 25, 2018.68 The EU's regulators gave companies a two-year
runway to achieve compliance after passing the regulations in 2016.69
However, a large number of companies reported that they were unable
to reach the deadline. 70 For example, in a study of one thousand

companies conducted in April 2018, half said they would not achieve
compliance by the deadline. 7 1 Additionally, in 2017-only one year
until the deadline-61 percent of companies reported that they had yet
to begin the process of working toward GDPR compliance. 72
Despite the reality that several companies have missed the May
2018 deadline and are yet to be considered GDPR-compliant, the EU

63.
See List of companies for which the EUBCR cooperationprocedure is closed,
EUROPEAN COMM'N (May 24, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/itemdetail.cfm?itemid=613841 [https://perma.cc/4QJJ-KWC7] (archived Feb. 13, 2020).
64. Id.
65.
Scott & Cerulus, supra note 1.
66.
See Corey Doctorow, The coming EUprivacy regulation will end up remaking
the world's web, BOINGBOING (Feb. 3, 2018), https://boingboing.net/2018/02/03/race-tothe-top.html [https://perma.cc/855N-F7HS] (archived Nov. 15, 2019).
67. Id.
68.
See Sarah Jeong, No one's ready for GDPR, VERGE (May 22, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/22/17378688/gdpr-general-data-protectionregulation-eu [https-//perma.cc/D56R-LUA3] (archived Nov. 15, 2019).
69.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72: Id.
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73
continues to encourage data controllers to strive toward compliance.

Consider the following warning from a website affiliated with the EU:
If the GDPR deadline has been missed, it is imperative the business in question
acts urgently to become compliant. Demonstrating strong data rights
management is important to both customers and employees; they should
understand why the data is collected and how it is handled on a legal basis.
Current business data processes need to be looked at as an immediate priority
74
so that the company doesn't risk non-compliance penalties.

likely stem from the severe sanctions
These warnings
75
Entities that fail to comply with the
contemplated by the GDPR.
76
First, the GDPR
GDPR face hefty costs from a variety of sources.
empowers individuals to bring lawsuits against any company that
77
Companies that
violated their rights under the regulatory scheme.

violate the GDPR may also face private suits filed by corporate
partners and shareholders. 78 Second, privacy regulators are entitled to
impose administrative fines up to 20 million, or 4 percent of annual
79
global turnover, whichever is higher. This means that a company like

Facebook could pay E2.3 billion ($2.6 billion) for a GDPR violation. 80 In
fact, Google had to pay a $57 million fine in January 2019 for failing to
properly notify users how it collected data to present personalized
advertisements.81 Third, each EU member state has the ability to

impose additional administrative fines for noncompliance. 82 One
member state's imposition of an administrative fine does not preempt
83
Even though
another member state's ability to impose its own fine.
the GDPR outlines specific factors that the member states should
consider when determining appropriate administrative fines, in the
84
end the fine need only be "effective, proportionate, and dissuasive."
Beyond the liabilities specifically spelled out in the GDPR,
noncompliant companies may also face costs in the form of lost

See GDPR is the most important change in 20 years, supra note 22.
73.
74. Id.
See GDPR, supranote 20, at art. 58.
75.
76. Id. at art. 83(4).
77.
Id. at art. 82(1).
Christopher Cole, Nielsen Hit With Shareholder Suit Over EU Privacy
78.
https://www.law360.com/articles/1076082
2018),
(Aug. 27,
Impacts, LAw360
[https://perma.cc/75FS-FCK2] (archived Nov. 15, 2019) (Nielsen Holdings is facing a
shareholder lawsuit alleging it misled investors about how the GDPR affected its
financial performance).
79.
Id.
Curtiss, supra note 9, at 104.
80.
Adam Satariano, Google Is Fined $57 Million Under Europe's Data Privacy
81.
2019),
21,
(Jan.
TIMES
N.Y.
Law,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01 /21/technology/google-europe-gdpr-fine.html
[https://perma.cc/545R-VWWW] (archived Nov. 15, 2019).
Curtiss, supra note 9, at 104.
82.
Id.
83.
84.
Id.
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credibility or reduced customer loyalty. 85 Assuming a majority of the
private sector is eventually able to achieve GDPR compliance,
customers may start to expect this level of data protection from all
companies with which they interact.86 Companies that fail to do so may

tarnish their images in the public's eye, thereby reducing sales
numbers.87 In turn, this loss of credibility may deter potential joint
ventures, which would reduce the profitability of these companies. 88
Furthermore, noncompliant companies would be unable to hide these
transgressions from their customers, shareholders, and business

partners because the GDPR obligates companies to directly report any
possible leaks of a user's personal data.8 9
B. Current Data Privacy Regimes in Africa

Africa currently lacks a unified regulatory approach to personal
data protection, even though the continent had the world's fastest
growth in internet usage over the past decade. 90 Importantly, no
African country currently has domestic laws that comply with the
GDPR. 91 In fact, more than half of the fifty-four countries in Africa lack
any data protection or privacy laws whatsoever. 92 And while some

African countries have taken steps to develop legislation aimed at data
protection, these steps have not culminated in any meaningful data
protections at the national level. 93 For example, of the fourteen
countries that currently have data protection legislation, nine lack any

regulating bodies to enforce the laws. 94
Efforts to adopt comprehensive data protection legislation in

Africa have occurred at the continental, regional, and national levels. 9 5
For example, the African Union (AU) in 2014 passed the Convention
on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, which aimed to
establish regulatory frameworks for personal data protection at the

85.
See Panda Media Center, The GDPR Is Here: Now What?, PANDA SEc. (May
23, 2018), https:J/www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/security/gdpr -is-here-what-now/
[httpsJ/perma.cc/RE6B-UEZQ] (archived Nov. 15, 2019).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90.
See Maggie Fick & Alexis Akwagyiram, In Africa, scant dataprotection leaves
internet users exposed, REUTERS, Apr. 4, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-

facebook-africa/in-africa -scant-data-protection-leaves-internet-users -exposedidUSKCN1HB1SZ [https://perma.cc/SD4A-ZKSR] (archived Nov. 15, 2019).
91.
See DALBERG ADVISORS, supra note 13, at 12.
92.
See Fick & Akwagyiram, supra note 90.
93.

See DALBERG ADVISORS, supra note 13, at 10.

94.
See Fick & Akwagyiram, supra note 90.
95.
See Data protection regulations and international data flows: Implications for
trade and development, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. 35 (2016),
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict20l6dlen.pdf
[https-/perma.ccM52E-FB4Y] (archived Nov. 15, 2019) [hereinafter UNCTAD].
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96
However, unlike the GDPR's automatic
national and regional levels.
enforceability, the AU convention lacks any legal force until African
countries adopt the provisions into their national legislation. 97 As of
early 2016, no African country has ratified the convention, which
severely limits the AU convention's actual impact on African data
protection. 98 Nonetheless, the AU convention provides a regulatory
framework that African countries can use as a model to draft their own
data protection legislation. 99 Furthermore, the AU convention
encourages African countries to recognize the importance of protecting
00
personal data and promoting global digitalization.1
Two regional initiatives are also noteworthy. The Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted an initiative in
2010 that aimed to harmonize data protection regimes across its
member states.101 As of 2016, seven countries within ECOWAS have
enacted national laws that comply with the agreement. 102
Additionally, the nineteen-member group known as the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) has brainstormed
03
However, only three
regional solutions for data privacy problems.1
COMESA countries currently have data protection laws in place:

Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles. 104 Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Uganda have not yet passed any data protection laws, but they are
currently considering drafts of data protection bills in their
Parliaments. 105 In contrast, nine members of COMESA (Burundi,
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Libya,
Rwanda, Sudan, and Swaziland) lack any meaningful regulations
focused on data protection--either enacted into law or up for
06
consideration in their Parliaments.1
In whole, the present regulatory environment within individual
African countries can be divided into four subgroups: (1) twenty-two
countries currently have some sort of data privacy legislation in place,
(2) seven countries have drafted data privacy legislation but have not
yet passed such legislation, (3) thirteen countries lack data privacy

legislation altogether, and (4) twelve countries do not process data on

96.
Id.
See Privacy is Paramount:Personal Data Protection in Africa, DELOITTE 6
97.
(2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/risk/za_Privacy_
[https://perma.cc/2VJ4-T8KQ]
isParamount-Personal DataProtectioninAfrica.pdf
(archived Nov. 15, 2019) [hereinafter DeloitteReport].
98.
See UNCTAD, supranote 95.
See Deloitte Report, supra note 97.
99.
100. Id.
101. See UNCTAD, supra note 95.
102. Id.
103. See DALBERG ADVISORS, supra note 13, at 10.
104. See id. at 16.
105. See id.
106. See id.
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a large scale. 107 This Note will evaluate examples of African countries

that fall into the first two categories.
1. South Africa: Active Legislation
South Africa's e-commerce market has exploded in the past
decade, due in large part to the increased use of mobile phones in the
country.1 08 Online spending in South Africa is projected to grow at an
annual rate of 15 percent through 2021.109 Internet penetration within

South Africa has reached 54 percent as of 2018.110 These gains in
internet usage are not contained within the borders of the country. For
example, the EU is one of South Africa's largest trading partners,
comprising 40 percent of its e-commerce business.1 11

In

2013,

South Africa

passed the

Protection

of Personal

Information Act (POPIA), which afforded South Africans the
constitutional right to data privacy.11 2 In basing POPIA on the EU's
personal data protection framework, South Africa's legislature
mirrored many provisions in the GDPR.11 3 First, POPIA gives South
Africans a great degree of autonomy over their personal data, including

the right to be informed about how entities are collecting and using
their data.11 4 In addition, POPIA requires all organizations to report
data breaches within seventy-two hours to the country's Information
Regulator-a governmental body established under POPIA that is

tasked with regulating and enforcing the act's provisions. 115 The
penalties for noncompliance with POPIA include fines up to R$10

107. See UNCTAD, supra note 95.
108. See Carin Smith, How Ecommerce is Exploding in SA, FIN24 (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.fin24.com/Economy/how-ecommerce-is-exploding-in-sa -20180316
[https://perma.cc/SJ8R-57QE] (archived Nov. 16, 2019).
109. See
South
Africa
Ecommerce,
ExPORT.GOV,
https://www.export.gov/article?id=South-Africa-ecommerce (last updated July 14, 2019)
[httpsJ/perma.cc/EE9B-BTRS] (archived Nov. 16, 2019).
110. See Marcia Kaplan, Africa: An Emerging Ecommerce Market with Many
Changes,
PRACTICAL
ECOMMERCE
(June
13,
2018),
https://www.practicalecommerce.com/africa-emerging-ecommerce-market-manychallenges [https://perma.cc/YXN3-CHDT] (archived Nov. 16, 2019).
111. See South Africa, supra note 18.
112. See Melanie Kirsten Hart, South Africa: Data Protection in Terms of POPLA
and
the
GDPR,
MONDAQ
(June
29,
2018),
http://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/713936/data+protection/Data+protection+in+ter
ms+of+POPIA+and+the+GDPR [https-J/perma.cc/9NJQ-FKTH] (archived Nov. 16,
2019).
113. See Michael Bratt, POPIA is still on the way...but it's taking time,
THEMEDIAONLINE (Aug. 14, 2018), https://themediaonline.co.za/2018/08/popia-is-stillon-the-way-but-its-taking-time/ [https-/perma.cc/5Z9R-UTVS] (archived Nov. 16, 2019).
114. See Hart, supra note 112.
115. See Data Protection Laws of the World: South Africa, DLA PIPER (Jan. 28,
2019),
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=ZA
[https://perma.cc/2E5R-6KS6 (archived Nov. 12, 2019).
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million, ten years in jail, or damages awarded to the individual data

subjects who were harmed by the entity's noncompliance.116
Despite passing POPIA in 2013, the South African government

has yet to put the legislation into effect.11 7 While limited sections of the
act have been implemented, the bulk of the legislation will commence
at a later date that has not yet been determined by the president.118
Additionally, the Information Regulator is still in the process of

staffing its office.11 9 These delays have come at a cost. South Africa has
faced several major data breaches since 2013, including the Jigsaw
Holdings "masterdeeds.sql" leak, which released the home addresses

20
Without a
and contact information of millions of South Africans.1
will go
cyberattacks
these
Regulator,
Information
fully functioning
the
fully
in
effect,
POPIA
is
even
once
And
unpunished.121
largely
that
given
year,
another
for
be
felt
not
will
impact
legislation's
22
companies have a one-year grace period to come into compliance.1

2. Kenya: Draft Legislation

Known as "Silicon Savannah," Kenya represents the epicenter of
Africa's technology movement.1 23 Kenya's internet usage has exploded
over the past decade, with internet penetration surging from about 1
percent in 2000 to 26 percent in 2017.124 Research shows that two of
25
every three Kenyans have access to the internet.1 And of Kenya's 44
6
million citizens, 8.5 million use Facebook on a monthly basis.12 Kenya

116.

Id.

117.
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Protection of Personal Information Act

Summary,
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https://www.michalson s.com/focus -areas/privacy-and-data-protection/protection-ofpersonal-information-act-popia (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/LT2FMWDN] (archived Nov. 12, 2019).
118. See Tehillah Niselow, Five massive data breaches affecting South Africans,
MAIL & GUARDIAN (June 19, 2019), https://mg.co.za/article/2018-06-19-five-massivedata-breaches-affecting-south-africans [https-/perma.cc/J25H -SNPY] (archived Nov. 12,
2019).
119. See Deloitte Report, supra note 97.
120. See Hart, supra note 112.
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123. See Jake Bright & Aubrey Hruby, The Rise Of Silicon Savannah And Africa's
Tech Movement, TECH CRUNCH (July 23, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/07/23/the[https://perma.cc/K73G-2REZ]
rise-of-silicon-savannah-and-africas-tech-movement/
(archived Nov. 12, 2019).
124. See Sabina Frizell, How Kenya's New Data Privacy Bill Could Hurt Its
Economy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-

[https-//perma.cc/PM6N-HNRP]
kenyas-new-data-privacy-bill-could-hurt-its-economy
(archived Nov. 12, 2019).
125. See Collins Omulo, New study shows more Kenyans have internet access,
DAILY NATION (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Internet-access-grows-in(archived
[https://perma.cc/4GWZ-7YBF]
Kenya/1056-3895304-nswOnnz/index.html
Nov. 12, 2019).
126. See Fick & Akwagyiram, supra note 90.
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is also recognized as a hub for technology companies. 127 For example,
IBM in 2013 opened a $100 million research center in the country-the

company's first center in all of Africa.1 2 8 Kenya is also home to many
successful start-up companies, including M-PESA, which was one of

the first mobile money services to be regularly used by African
communities. 129
Kenya's rapid rise in the digital world is largely due to its
government's investment in technology infrastructure.1 30 In 2011, the
country launched an open government data platform, which allowed
companies to use this communal data information at no cost when
building their businesses.131 The Kenyan government predicted that

this open platform would increase the information technology sector's
contribution to the gross domestic product to 15 percent. 132
Additionally, the Kenyan government has driven innovation by

adopting a light-touch

regulatory approach,

which allows

still-

developing technology companies to flourish without fear of
burdensome policy requirements.1 33
Because of this relaxed regulatory approach, Kenya currently
lacks a comprehensive framework for data protection.1 34 However,
several election-related privacy scandals led the country to draft data
protection legislation, which would offer citizens substantial
protections for their data.1 35 Many of the requirements within this bill
echo the GDPR.136 For example, entities must inform digital users of
the personal data they are collecting, the purpose for this data
collection, and how long the entities will store this data. 137

Additionally, the bill establishes security standards for the storage of
data, and digital users have the right to request that their data be
deleted or corrected.1 38
However, some scholars criticize this draft legislation as being too
restrictive.139 Small businesses argue that this draft legislation will
cripple Kenya's still-developing digital economy by favoring incumbent

127. See Bright & Hruby, supra note 123.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Frizell, supra note 124.
131. See Alex Howard, Open Data Catches on in Kenya, FORBES (July 15, 2011),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/oreillymedia/2011/07/15/open-data-catches-on-inkenya/#40c997767c56 [https://perma.cc/LP45-7WWN] (archived Nov. 12, 2019).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Frizell, supra note 124.
135. Id.
136. Brian Obilo, Kenya DataProtectionBill 2018, INTERNET YETU (Aug. 25, 2018),
https://internetyetu.org/kenya-data-protection-bill-2018/ [https://perma.cc/RC5V-94EP]
(archived Nov. 12, 2019).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Frizell, supra note 124.
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companies.1 40 For example, multinational and large local companies
have the ability to shoulder costs for compliance, while small
businesses may not have the capital necessary to satisfy the new
requirements. 141 Additionally, large companies likely already hired
staff members to advise on compliance, giving them a leg up in
42
adapting their preexisting business practices to the new legislation.1
Finally, newly formed companies lack the advantage of leveraging a
lax regulatory environment, which greatly contributed to the success
43
of incumbent technology companies.1
The draft legislation also calls for a data localization provision,
which would make it illegal for entities to send Kenyans' sensitive
44
Critics of this provision argue
personal data outside the country.1
that sensitive data is too broadly defined, thereby limiting the private
sector's ability to reap the economic gains achieved through crossborder data flow.1 4 5 This may disproportionately affect small- and
medium-sized businesses, which are more likely to outsource their
consumers' data to foreign experts that handle data security and
storage, instead of using their limited resources to build their own local
6
data centers.1 4

As of late 2019, Kenya has still not passed this piece of draft
legislation.1 47 The Ministry of Information and Technology is currently
48
reviewing the general public's comments about the legislation.1 If
this bill passes, Kenya will join Rwanda as the only two countries in
49
East Africa to have data protection legislation in place.1

III. ANALYSIS
As more countries prioritize the protection of consumer data, the
rules on cross-border data transfers will become stricter.1 50 As such,
countries face significant economic risks if they lack adequate data
protection regimes, especially given the exponential growth of the
global digital economy.151
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142. Id.
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144. Id.; see also Data Protection Act (2019) THE LAWS OF KENYA No. 19.
145. See Frizell, supra note 124.
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African countries are particularly at risk. 152 Admittedly, the
cultural and economic differences between each African country make
it difficult to articulate a one-size-fits-all analysis. However, there are
several factors shared by African countries that complicate the
continent's overall ability to achieve GDPR compliance. These factors
demonstrate how the GDPR disproportionately affects and jeopardizes

Africa's position in the global e-commerce market. 5 3
A. Stifling Innovation, Investment, and Economic Growth
Similar to countries that market themselves as tax havens,
several African countries have adopted a relaxed approach to data
privacy in order to attract companies seeking to avoid burdensome
legal requirements. 154 For example, Kenya's relaxed regulatory
approach led to the emergence of nearly 3,500 tech-related ventures in
sub-Saharan Africa alone.1 55 This also led to an increase in venture
capital financing, with over $1 billion being invested into technology
start-up companies from 2012 to 2018.156
Under the GDPR, however, African countries will no longer be
able to market their relaxed regulatory environments as a way to drum
up business, causing them to lose this competitive edge over other
countries.15 7 In turn, this could stifle Africa's current rate of digital
innovation.1 5 8 For countries like Kenya that have previously profited
from lax privacy regimes, this legislative shift may foster ill will
between the government and the private sector.1 59 Small businesses
may argue that the adoption of strong data privacy laws deprives
newly formed companies from
leveraging
a lax regulatory
environment-an advantage that allowed incumbent companies to

flourish just years before.1 60
The shift to comprehensive data privacy regimes may also
motivate some companies to take undue risks.161 In weighing the high
costs of compliance with the chance of being caught for noncompliance,
some companies may take the gamble and continue existing business

practices that do not comply with the GDPR. However, the stakes are
high for GDPR violations, including fines of up to £20 million or 4
percent of annual global turnover, whichever is higher. 162 And
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although companies across the world can engage in such risky
behavior, the reputational harm associated with this behavior
163
Companies
arguably has a larger impact in developing countries.
within such countries are competing to gain a foothold in the global
market. 164 The risky behavior of one bad actor can taint the global
perception of that country's market as a whole, negatively impacting
the reputations of other companies that are in compliance with the
GDPR. 165 This risk is particularly high in countries that lack
regulatory and judicial bodies to enforce the newly adopted data
16 6
privacy regimes.
Finally, African companies could face investment losses if they fail
to comply with the GDPR.1 6 7 According to a recent survey conducted
by PricewaterhouseCoopers, 38 percent of companies that have
finalized their GDPR-compliance programs engaged their investor
relations departments to market this compliance, indicating that these
companies hope to highlight their early compliance as a potential
differentiator in their markets. 16 8 As more companies begin marketing
their own compliance achievements to investors, this may become a
that all investors look for, thereby
standardized disclosure
disadvantaging companies that do not have the financial resources or
expertise to reach this level of compliance. This same argument can
also be applied to customer loyalty: if multiple companies begin touting
their GDPR compliance to customers in order to strengthen customer
trust in their businesses, then customers may soon come to expect such
promises and thus discount companies that are unable to market this

level of trust.1 6 9
B. Enforcement Issues
Assuming African countries actually adopt comprehensive data
privacy legislation, some of these countries lack stable judicial
branches to effectively enforce the legislation and provide redress for
violated rights. 170 This may be a key stumbling block for African
countries seeking to comply with the GDPR under the first pathway:

to
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national adoption of laws and regulations that comply with the

GDPR.171
As explained in Part II of this Note, when the EU evaluates
whether a country's data privacy legislation constitutes a satisfactory
equivalent to the GDPR, it assesses whether the country can effectively
implement and enforce this legislation, in addition to the country's
overall commitment to the rule of law. 172 However, several African
countries received low scores on the World Bank's Rule of Law Indexa data set that evaluates how much confidence agents have in each
country's court system, the extent to which contractual and property
rights are enforced in each country, and the likelihood that the rules of

society are followed in each country. 173 For example, the Central
African Republic has an overall score of -1.73, putting the country in
the bottom 10 percent globally.1 74 Countries with questionable judicial
structures thus face an uphill battle in attempting to prove that their

data privacy legislation is equivalent to the GDPR.1 75
Furthermore, even if these countries can pass GDPR-equivalent
legislation, many of these countries would be unable to adequately
enforce the legislation because of their undependable judicial systems.
Many African court systems are reported to have extreme delays. 176
Additionally, studies show that some Africans do not trust their

countries' judicial branches because of corruption concerns. 177 These
issues may deter citizens from seeking redress for violations of their
own data privacy rights.
Additionally, many African countries lack independent agencies
to implement and enforce data protection legislation.1 78 For example,
although Mauritius has established a Data Protection Authority, the
Authority institutionally depends on the Prime Minister's Office.179

This may reduce the authority's ability to individually impose fines on
entities that violate the country's data protection laws.1 8 0 Additionally,
some countries have not established a data protection authority at all,
such as Cape Verde, even though many of these countries called for the
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establishment of such authorities in their legislation. 181 Without
independent agencies enforcing these laws, bad actors will continue to
violate consumers' data privacy, leaving consumers with no redress for
these invasions and risking the country's overall access to the EU's
trading block.
Last, data protection may not be a priority for many African
countries, given common concerns about corruption and public
health. 182 For example, if an African country is dealing with issues
concerning its citizens' access to clean water or safe housing, the
country likely will not prioritize the adoption of comprehensive data
privacy regulations. 183 Thus, some African countries may opt to devote
their resources to combating these causes rather than creating
84
effective data protection regimes.1

C. Issues with Technological Expertise
Although the technological capacities of many African countries
have skyrocketed in recent decades, technological inferiority may still
85
be a hurdle for African companies seeking to comply with the GDPR.i
Research shows that this potential hurdle largely stems from two
sources: (1) a lack of local schools offering technological education to
African citizens and (2) the migration of skilled labor to other
186
markets-a phenomenon colloquially known as "brain drain."
The promulgation of GDPR-type legislation in Africa would
require these countries to invest more resources in technological
education. 187 A technologically educated workforce is crucial to
achieving and maintaining GDPR compliance. While some developing
countries boast strong educational opportunities that churn out a

technologically educated workforce, others lack robust educational
infrastructures. 188 In turn, this educational deficiency may deter
larger corporations from establishing offices in these areas, given
concerns that there are not enough technologically educated workers

to maintain operations in these offices. 189 Thus, even if these countries
invest more in their education systems, there may not be enough job
90
opportunities in the private sector to employ the recent graduates.1
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This limited pool of qualified workers becomes even more
problematic when considering brain drain. 191 Research shows that in
2013 one in nine Africans with a graduate-level education left the
continent to live in developed areas like Europe, North America, and
elsewhere.1 9 2 There are several reasons why educated Africans may
leave the continent, including political instability and the attraction of
higher pay elsewhere. 193 According to the World Economic Forum's
Global Competitiveness Report from 2014 to 2015, Burundi is the
African country least able to hold onto its educated workforce, with
countries like Algeria, Mauritania, Chad, and Guinea close behind.1 94
Of course, the generalized dangers of brain drain are not present in
every African country.1 9 5 Rwanda, for example, has been reported to
retain a large proportion of its educated workforce, as well as attract
international talent. 196 Additionally, a portion of African workers
leaving their home countries are moving to other countries within

Africa that have more developed economies and industries, such as
South Africa.1 9 7 However, the issue is prevalent enough to lead South
Africa's former president Thabo Mbeki to label Africa's brain drain
issue as "frightening" in 2016. 198 Without a technologically
sophisticated workforce, both the public and the private sectors risk

violating the GDPR.1 99
D. Data Imperialismand the Brussels Effect

The GDPR's one-size-fits-all approach does not take into account
the different cultural, political, and economic realities existing in
countries outside the EU.200 This indifference led one critic to argue
that the GDPR is "yet another diktat handed down by former colonial

'

20
powers in a form of 'data imperialism."'
This so-called data imperialism is formally known as the Brussels

Effect. 202 Coined by Columbia Law professor Anu Bradford in 2012, the
Brussels Effect describes how the EU's global power can influence
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other countries to adopt regulations similar to those adopted by the
EU.203 According to this theory, the combination of the EU's market
influence and its use of extraterritorial regulations allows the EU to

set strict regulatory standards for countries around the globe. 20 4 Other

countries find that it is not economically or legally practical to
maintain regulatory standards lower than those set by the EU, leading
to the "Europeanization" of legal frameworks in developed and
developing countries alike. 205 This regulatory globalization thus

creates a "race to the top," whereby domestic regulations become
increasingly more stringent as the global economy becomes more
integrated.206
In the context of data privacy, the EU approaches issues like
privacy, security, data protection, and rights differently than many

African nations. 207 Through the Brussels Effect, local values in Africa
may become obscured by Eurocentric ideals. This is particularly
take-it-or-leave-it
strict
the GDPR's
considering
problematic
approach. 208 Because the EU requires countries to either pass
domestic laws that comply with the GDPR's expansive obligations or
risk losing access to the world's largest trading block, countries may
feel economically forced to bend to the EU's definition of data

privacy. 209 Although the GDPR does not require countries to replicate
the GDPR's provisions word-for-word in their own legislation, the EU's
equivalency standard demands stricter legislation than some countries
2 10
Countries like Kenya would no
may have drafted on their own.
longer be able to perpetuate a lax regulatory environment in order to
21
spur technological and economic growth. 1 Because of this, critics

argue that the EU is using its economic muscle to impose its own
definition of data privacy on countries around the world without
2
concern for the unique economic circumstances in each country. 12
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IV. SOLUTION
The above discussion begs the question: How can these complex
issues be solved? Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions given the
litany of complicating factors listed below.
First, the GDPR affects African nations in several wayseconomically, politically, and culturally. The sheer breadth of these
issues, as well as their overlapping effects, create multiple obstacles

for African countries seeking to comply with the GDPR. What is more,
the entire range of the GDPR's effects is not yet known.
Second, each African country has unique circumstances that
require individualized responses. There is no one-size-fits-all solution
here. For example, different countries are at different stages in their

legislative processes. There are also varying levels of technological
infrastructure, educational opportunities, and cultural viewpoints in
each country. As such, each country's optimal response will be

different.
Third, there is the question of who is responsible for working
toward a solution. Some may argue that individual African countries
must shoulder this responsibility-if these countries want to compete
in the global e-commerce market, they must meet the qualifications.
Others may argue that the EU has a responsibility to lessen the
GDPR's impact on developing nations.
Fourth, it is unlikely that the EU will carve out exceptions for

developing nations. The GDPR is intended to set global standards for
data protection while giving users unprecedented autonomy over their
data. The EU would jeopardize these idealistic goals if it suspended
liability against African nations-even for a short period of time. EU
residents may not be able to discern whether their data was being
processed by a company in compliance with the GDPR or a company

exempted under the GDPR, robbing these users of the ability to decide
who gets to process their data for what purpose. There is also a high
chance that data breaches could occur during this suspension period.
Furthermore, if the EU broadly suspended liability against all African
companies regardless of their compliance initiatives, some African
companies may rest on their laurels during this period and fail to
undertake important steps toward achieving GDPR compliance. This
apathy would adversely impact those companies in the long term,
reducing their abilities to achieve GDPR compliance once the EU lifts
this suspension. For these reasons, a carve-out exemption for African
nations is likely not the optimal solution.

Despite the above challenges, there are some critical steps that
must be taken to reduce the GDPR's effects on different African
nations. The below considerations are by no means a cure-all for these
complex issues; much more will need to be done. However, the
considerations listed below represent some solid first steps toward
leveling the data privacy playing field in Africa.
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A. PassingGDPR-CompliantLegislation at the Regional Level
African countries need to propose and debate different legislative
measures for data protection. These legislative efforts should likely
2 13
Regional initiatives sufficiently ensure
occur at the regional level.
that the individual realities of each country are accounted for in the
legislative process. 214 This model may also prevent individual
countries from hiding behind their own apathy toward passing such
laws, thereby ensuring that a greater number of countries actively
2 15
participate in this legislative process.
To ensure these regional legislative efforts have a tangible impact,
the African regions should mirror the GDPR in structuring their
legislation as binding regulations, as compared to nonbinding
directives like the African Union's Convention on Cyber Security and
Personal Data Protection from 2014. 216 Otherwise, individual
countries may not adopt or implement these data privacy frameworks.
This nonaction could risk the region's overall access to the EU trading
block and jeopardize economic growth in the regions' private sectors.
Admittedly, there are several drawbacks associated with
legislating on the regional level. This model could result in another
patchwork scheme where certain regions achieve GDPR compliance
while others fall by the wayside. Issues like brain drain and
disparity could still be present in this model.
educational
Furthermore, there are still social, legal, and economic differences
between countries in each regional block that could complicate their
legislative efforts. However, the group incentive of accessing the EU
market may be enough to overcome these barriers, thereby giving
African nations a better shot at achieving GDPR compliance on a wide
scale.

B. Enforcing GDPR-CompliantLegislationat the Regional Level
Once these regions pass data protection legislation, they should
appoint data protection authorities to enforce the laws. Importantly,
this enforcement should occur at the regional level, as opposed to the
national level. This group process creates greater enforcement power,
especially considering that several individual countries lack stable
prosecution offices and judicial branches.
It is imperative that African governments take action. Individual
companies achieving compliance at an organizational level is not
enough by itself to achieve widespread GDPR compliance in Africa. 217

213. Id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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This is for a variety of reasons. First, the process of achieving
organizational compliance with the GDPR is lengthy and expensive,
which may deter many companies from undertaking such efforts. 21 8
Second, a solely organizational approach would disadvantage smalland medium-sized businesses that lack the resources and expertise to

achieve compliance at the organizational level. 219 This would be
especially problematic in African countries that have a higher
proportion of small- and medium-sized businesses, thus creating a
larger economic impact in these countries. 220 Finally, aggrieved
customers need reassurance from African governments that companies
will be held legally responsible for breaches of their data privacy
rights. 221 Without the adoption of data protection regulations at the
governmental level, there would be no way to ensure the private sector
is adequately protecting citizens' data privacy. 22 2
Admittedly, there are several unanswered questions associated
with this regional enforcement model. How should these agencies be

structured? How should they decide which cases to pursue? Will these
enforcement bodies be stable considering the lack of stability in some
individual countries' own backyards?
Despite these unanswered questions and others, the regional
enforcement model is a better solution than the alternatives. If these
enforcement efforts were made on a continent-wide basis, the
continental data authority may overlook the unique circumstances in
each country, thereby creating unworkable enforcement frameworks.
On the other hand, if individual countries took on this responsibility,
countries that lack stable enforcement bodies would inevitably fall
behind. An enforcement patchwork would emerge: some countries in
Africa would have robust data protection, while others would have

none at all. Because of these issues, the regional enforcement model
gives African nations the best chance of achieving widespread GDPR

compliance.
C. Investing in Technological Infrastructureand Training
In order to achieve meaningful GDPR compliance in Africa, the
private sector must also act. In a perfect world, these companies would
begin striving toward compliance as soon as possible. Even a few

months of delay could lead to massive profit losses for these companies,
especially as their competitors achieve compliance in other
countries. 223 Investors may come to consider GDPR compliance as a

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222.

See id.

223.

See Panda Media Center, supra note 85.
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prerequisite

before

investing

in

companies.
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Furthermore,

companies may require their commercial partners to be GDPRcompliant before entering into contracts with them. 225 If African
companies delay achieving compliance, they may miss out on this

business.
As these companies work to achieve GDPR compliance, they
should temporarily block EU customers. Although this likely will lead
to profit losses for these companies, the lost profits pale in comparison
to the level of fines these companies could face were the EU to label

them as noncompliant. 2 26 Indeed, the EU's top data protection officer,
European data protection supervisor Giovanni Buttarrelli, warned
regulators in April to be "vigilant about [companies'] attempts to game
the system." 227 As such, companies must not cut any corners or

interact with EU data subjects before they have achieved a reasonable
level of compliance with the GDPR.
All of this is easier said than done. Achieving compliance will
undoubtedly prove costly. For example, companies may need to invest
in new technologies to safely collect and store consumers' data, as well
as to monitor whether breaches have occurred and what data was
compromised in those breaches. 228 Additionally, companies must
invest resources into training their employees so they are aware of how
to handle a breach when it occurs and how to prevent breaches. These
initiatives may prove too costly for certain companies. Short of some

type of government

subsidy or private infusion of cash, many

companies will be financially unable to comply with the GDPR.

V. CONCLUSION

The GDPR will undoubtedly strengthen data protection across the
world, giving users unprecedented control over how their personal data

is collected, stored, and used. However, the GDPR's idealistic vision of
consumer data creates several financial and regulatory challenges for
governments and companies alike. This impact may be felt strongest
by certain countries in Africa, many of which lack the existing
regulatory frameworks and technological infrastructures needed to
comply with the GDPR. Furthermore, the GDPR's extraterritoriality
features may amount to data imperialism, allowing the EU to impose
its own definition of data privacy on African countries without concern
for their unique social values and economic realities. This may

224.
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228.
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jeopardize the dynamism and economic growth
countries.

of many African

There are no easy solutions for these complex issues. However,
African nations should begin working toward a solution by taking
certain steps, including passing regional legislation, creating regional
enforcement authorities, and generating investment in technological

infrastructures and trainings. These actions can help reduce the
GDPR's disproportionate impact on African nations, allowing Africa to
continue contributing to the global e-commerce market.
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